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NOTES AND COMMENTS
prevent dismissal. There is indeed a long line of cases supporting
the proposition that no appeal lies from a mere decree respecting
costs.
3 5
It seems clear that the Robinson and Wetzel cases establish some
new rules in the field of mootness. Whether or not they will be
followed is of course not known. But it appears that the Court has
applied the collateral consequences line of cases, previously limited
to situations where the defendant had been released from prison,
to cases where the defendant has died. It also appears that the doc-
trine, which was under attack in Parker, has been revived, and that
Pollard still stands. It is not here intended to argue whether the
Court is right or wrong in these decisions, but it is hoped that the
Court in future cases will make clear to the public and to the bar
what its position is on this matter, preferably with a full decision
squarely discussing the problem.
LAWRENCE T. HAMMOND, JR.
Constitutional Law-Financial Responsibility Act-Liability of In-
surer Without Notice
In Lane v. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co.' the North Carolina Supreme
Court recently affirmed a trial court decision imposing liability on
a defendant who had absolutely no notice or opportunity to be heard
before his liability became irrevocably fixed.
The plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident as a result
of the negligence of an "assigned risk" whom the defendant insured.'
The insured did not stop at the scene of the accident and did not
file an accident report3 Consequently, neither the plaintiff nor the
"Heitmuller v. Stokes, 256 U.S. 359 (1921); Wingert v. First Natl
Bank, 223 U.S. 670 (1912); Paper-Bag Cases, 105 U.S. 766 (1882); Elastic
Fabrics Co. v. Smith, 100 U.S. 110 (1879); Canter v. American Ins. Co., 28
U.S. (3 Pet.) 307 (1830). But where the authority of the court below to
assess the costs which it levied is challenged, the case is not moot even
though the costs are all that remain to be settled. Newton v. Consolidated
Gas Co., 265 U.S. 78 (1924) ; Citizens' Bank v. Cannon, 164 U.S. 319 (1896).
-258 N.C. 318, 128 S.E.2d 398 (1962).
2 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.34 (Supp. 1961), provides that the Commis-
sioner of Insurance shall equitably apportion among insurance carriers "those
applicants for motor vehicle policies who are required to file proof of financial
responsibility.. . but who are unable to secure such insurance through ordi-
nary methods."
'N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 20-166, to -182 (Supp. 1961) provide that a wilful
failure to stop is punishable by imprisonment for up to five years and/or a
fine of $500. Failure to file an accident report as required by N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 20-166.1 (Supp. 1961) is a misdemeanor.
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investigating officer included the insured's name on the accident
reports they were required to file.' Such inclusion would have given
the defendant notice of the accident.' When the plaintiff subse-
quently discovered the identity of the insured, service of process was
obtained, and judgment by default and inquiry followed against the
insured. The insured failed to inform the defendant of the accident
or the suit, thereby breaching his insurance contract.' When the
plaintiff sued to collect as judgment creditor,7 the trial court found
that the defendant was liable, despite the complete lack of notice.
On appeal, the defendant claimed that the statute, as applied, was
unconstitutional as violating the due process requirements of notice
and opportunity to be heard. The court held that the constitutional
question could not be entertained because it had not been raised at
the trial.' The defendant's liability became absolute on the happen-
ing of the accident, and subsequent policy violations by the insured
could not operate to defeat the plaintiff's right to recover.9
Where the contract of insurance was voluntarily made by the
parties in the normal course of business, the court, in a situation
similar to the principal case, had the constitutional issue squarely
before it and decided against the insurer.' 0 The court reasoned that
IN.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-166.1 (Supp. 1961), states that where property
damage is $100 or more, the persons involved in the accident and the in-
vestigating officer must file a report to the Department of Motor Vehicles
within tventy-four hours.5 When the accident reports are received by the Department of Motor
Vehicles, a matching process takes place. If one driver fails to file a report,
the department obtains his name from the other driver's report and imme-
diately requests the filing of the report. When the report is finally filed, a
portion of it is detached and sent to the insurance carrier involved, as notice
to the insurance company that its insured has been involved in an accident.
Since the identity of the insured was not discovered within the twenty-
four hour limit, the name of the insured was not available for the filing of
the reports. This meant the department had no way of making the insured
file the report so that the insurer would get notice of the accident. See Brief
for Defendent, p. 6.
'The insurance contract provided that the insured was to give notice to
the insurer as soon as practicable; the insured was to forward all notices
and legal papers sent to him; and the insurer was to be allowed to investi-
gate all or any claims deemed expedient by it. See Brief for Defendant, p. 4.
7 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(f) (1), (2) (Supp. 1961), provides that
the liability of the insurance company becomes absolute on the occurrence of
the accident. No policy violations by the insured can relieve the insurer of
its liability. The injured party has the right to recover from the insurer
without first satisfying the judgment against the insured.
8258 N.C. 318, 322, 128 S.E.2d 398, 400 (1962).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(f) (1) (Supp. 1961).
1 Swain v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 253 N.C. 120, 116 S.E.2d 482
(1960).
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the insurer assumed the risk of liability without notice from the
insured when it voluntarily entered into the agreement. Therefore,
the insurer was deemed to have waived his constitutional right to
notice. This holding is in accord with cases in other jurisdictions
which operate under similar financial responsibility statutes." How-
ever, the theory of these cases is inapposite where the contract is not
entirely voluntary, as with an "assigned risk." Moreover, in each
of these cases the insurer had at least some knowledge that its in-
sured had been involved in an accident.'"
In the principal case, although refusing to consider the consti-
tutional issue, the court referred to the middle district's decision in
Sanders v. Travelers Indem. Co. 3 on this point. However, the
only reference in that case to constitutionality is that "assigned
risk" legislation has been upheld. 4 Adequate notice and hearing
from a constitutional standpoint were not discussed. No direct
holding on the constitutionality of the statute as applied to the facts
in the principal case has been found.
To fully appreciate the nature of the problem raised, but not
decided, in the principal case, some basic factors must first be con-
sidered. In the absence of the type of financial responsibility statute
which North Carolina now has, the injured party derives his right
to collect from the insurer through the insured.'5 The injured party's
rights against the insurer are founded on the insurance contract.
Therefore if the insured breaches his contract by failing to abide by
the notice requirement, the injured party's rights against the insurer
are defeated. Under the financial responsibility act, the injured
party no longer has merely a derivative right. His rights are now
based on the statute, rather than the insurance contract.' 6 Therefore,
any violations of the contract, such as failure to give notice, do not
"
1E.g., Royal Indem. Co. v. Olmstead, 193 F.2d 451 (9th Cir. 1951);
Wilkinson v. Maryland Cas. Co., 119 F. Supp. 383 (E.D. Va. 1953); Kruger
v. California Highway Indem. Exch., 201 Cal. 672, 258 Pac. 602 (1927);
National Indem. Co. v. Simmons, 230 Md. 234, 186 A.2d 595 (1962).
" There appears to be no definite rule as to what can serve as constructive
notice. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306,
314 (1950). Even if constructive notice could be founded on the insurer's
knowledge of the accident, there would be no constructive notice in the prin-
cipal case because the insurer had no knowledge whatever of the accident.
144 F. Supp. 742 (M.D.N.C. 1956).
1
,Id. at 744.
See, e.g., Baldwin v. Fidelity Phenix Fire Ins. Co., 260 F.2d 951 (6th
Cir. 1958) ; Sheldon v. Bennett, 282 Mass. 240, 184 N.E. 722 (1933) ; Muncie
v. Travelers Ins. Co., 253 N.C. 74, 116 S.E.2d 482 (1960).
", See note 11 supra; 48 COLUm. L. REv. 799, 800 (1948).
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defeat the statutory right. Public policy demands that an injured
party's right to recover should not be defeated by an irresponsible
motorist's failure to give notice to his insurer.17 This line of rea-
soning, while sound, does not encompass a basic tenet of our legal
system that:
An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in
any proceeding, which is to be accorded finality is notice rea-
sonably calculated, under all circumstances, to apprise in-
terested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them
an opportunity to present their objections .... The notice
must be of such nature as reasonably to convey the required
information... and it must afford a reasonable time for those
interested to make their appearance.1
s
The conclusion follows that notice must be viewed in two aspects:
(1) as a requirement of the contract between the insurer and the
insured (which does not affect the insurer's liability), and (2) as
a requirement of due process (which does affect the insurer's
liability).
It is apparent that when a situation comparable to the principal
case reappears with a constitutional objection at the trial level, the
statute may be declared unconstitutional. Although the statutory
Tequirement that the insurer's liability will not be defeated by the
insured's failure to give notice appears to be unobjectionable, the
requirement of some sort of notice persists. The notice requirement
of due process is so embedded in our system of jurisprudence that a
statute imposing liability with absolutely no notice must necessarily
be invalid. 9
The court might, however, uphold the statute by applying the
"assumption of risk" theory. The insurer voluntarily chose to do
11 For a discussion of the deprivation of certain defenses of insurers, in-
cluding the insured's failure to give notice, see 40 ORE. L. REv. 351 (1961).8 Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314
(1950). In this case the Court held that notice by publication of settlements
of a trustee's account was insufficient to meet the requirements of due process
where the trustee knew of the beneficiaries' whereabouts. The principle of
Mulane has been repeatedly reaffirmed. Schroeder v. City of New York,
371 U.S. 208 (1962) (notice of condemnation proceedings published in county
newspapers); Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112 (1956) (notice by
publication of proceeding to fix compensation under eminent domain) ; Covey
v. Town of Somers, 351 U.S. 141 (1956) (notice of foreclosure of tax lien
by mail where person was known incompetent without guardian).
19 See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
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business in the state, knowing that he would have to deal with
"assigned risks" and that he would be subject to liability without
notice. Therefore the insurer waived his constitutional right to
notice. No cases have been found upholding any such condition
precedent to doing business in a state. Moreover, such a require-
ment would probably be "arbitrary and capricious" and hence un-
constitutional, since a reasonable alternative exists whereby notice
could be afforded the insurer.20
It is clear that curative legislation is needed in order to afford the
insurer notice and thereby prevent the statute from being invalidated.
Several devices could be used to effect this purpose: (1) make the
insurer a necessary party to the suit, (2) require the injured party
to give notice to the insurer, or21 (3) require that notice be given to
the insurer before damages are assessed on a default judgment.22
None of these would impose a great burden on the injured party,
because once the insured is found, it is a simple matter to locate the
insurer.2 3
By affording the insurer notice, the following results might be
obtained: (1) the opportunity for settlement out of court, and (2) a
reduction of the possibility of collusion between an unscrupulous
insured and a third party. Such curative legislation would not only
afford the insurer the requisite due process, but would also benefit
both the public and the courts.
JOHN SIKES JOHNSTON
20 There have been no cases decided on whether deprivation of notice could
be imposed on corporations by the state as a condition precedent to doing
business in the state. However, there have been numerous cases invalidating
regulations on businesses where the desired result could have been accom-
plished by alternative means which entailed a much lesser deprivation. See,
e.g., Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951); Weaver v.
Palmer Bros. Co., 270 U.S. 402 (1926).
" The insurer argued that either it should have been made a party to the
suit, or the plaintiff should have been required to notify it of the suit. Brief
for Defendant, p. 13. The plaintiff answered that this was a problem for the
legislature. Brief for Plaintiff, p. 7.
"' ME. Rlv. STAT. ch. 22, § 80(II) (E) (Supp. 1961) contains this pro-
vision.
"' This seems apparent because of the ease with which the injured party
discovered the insurance company for the purpose of satisfying the defaultjudgment in the principal case.
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